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CONTRACTS AND SALES 
Joseph Curtis* 
Legislatioll 
The major legislation enacted in the 1964 regular session of the General 
Assembly in the field of contracts and sales was, of course, the adoption of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, to become effective January 1, 1966.1 The 
Virginia version will have relatively few changes from the provisions of 
the 1962 Official Text promulgated by the American Law Institute and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. While there 
may have been surprisingly few changes, for a common-law sales jurisdic-
tion which had not adopted the Uniform Sales Act, close adherence to the 
official text was of course especially important to achieve the primary 
objective of national uniformity. In addition to enactment of the new uni-
form provisions, numerous related sections throughout the Virginia Code 
were amended to subordinate them to the uniform provisions where there 
might be conflict. 
Noteworthy contracts and sales legislation outside of the scope of the 
comprehensive Uniform Commercial Code dealt with jurisdictional matters, 
licensing requirements, and false and misleading advertising. 
New Code sections 8-81.1 through -81.52 confer personal jurisdiction over 
persons and other legal or commercial entities in actions arising from their 
transacting business within the state, contracting to supply services or things 
in the state, breach of warranty resulting in personal injury, and other 
matters with state nexus. Service of process may be made on an in-state 
agent, or on the Secretary of the Commonwealth, or as otherwise provided 
for by law. Additionally, the statute provides that one of the alternative 
venues is the county where the plaintiff resides. 
Code sections 38.1-735 through -745 now provide that any legal entity 
engaged "in financing the cost of premiums for insurance on subjects of 
insurance resident, located or to be performed" in Virginia is required to 
be licensed in the state.3 
Numerous forms of false or misleading advertising are made misdemeanors 
by new Code sections 18.1-131.1 through -131.8.4 
• Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M., 
1948, New York University. 
I. Va. Acts of Assembly 1964, ch. 219. 
2. VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 8-81.1 through -81.5 (Supp. 1964). 
3. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 38.1-735 through -745 (Supp. 1964). 
4. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 18.1-131.1 through -131.8 (Supp. 1964). For further discussion 
see Ritz, Criminal Law, 1963-1964 Annual Survey of Va. Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1287, 1300 
(1964). 
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Decisions 
A. Acceptance of Check Marked "Paid in Full" Does Not Always Consti-
tute Accord and Satisfaction 
Words sometimes speak louder than actions and proverbs. A check 
marked "paid in full" was received for an unliquidated and disputed claim, 
accompanied by a letter making it clear that defendants did not intend to 
pay any more than that. Plaintiffs, however, made their position equally 
dear to defendants that they were not accepting the check as full payment, 
and then deposited it with a self-serving endorsement that it was accepted 
only as partial payment on account. The Supreme Court of Appeals held 
in Atkins v. Boatwright5 that the check was not "expressly accepted by the 
creditor in satisfaction" as required to constitute accord and satisfaction 
under section 11-12 of the Virginia Code.6 Thus, the payee's act of deposit-
ing a check is not necessarily acceptance of a condition stated thereon, at 
least not when he makes it known to the maker that the condition will not 
be observed. Perhaps the fact that the makers did not demand return of 
the check when informed that it would not be treated as full payment, 
mentioned but seemingly not stressed by the Court, was more decisive than 
indicated. 
B. And Neither, in Some Circumstances, Is Acceptance of "Final Payment" 
In Day v. Abemathy,7 a road contractor was allowed to recover from the 
state for materials purchased by him and unused by reason of modifications 
of the road and bridge specifications subsequently made by the state en-
gineers. Although the primary issue was the interpretation of a specific 
provision of the contract relating to "eliminating items," the Court also 
discussed the consequences of the contractor's acceptance of a final payment 
which did not include reimbursement for the cost of the unused material. 
Since there was no discussion of the contractor's claim at the time of the 
final payment, and since the Highway Department was then fully aware 
that the claim had been filed and that it had not been acted upon, the Court 
found no waiver, accord and satisfaction, breach, or any other defense arising 
out of the contractor's acceptance. 
C. Unliquidated Contract Claims May Bear Interest 
Section 8-22 3 of the Virginia Code provides that "in any action whether 
on contract or for tort, the jury may allow interest on the sum found by 
the verdict, or any part thereof, and fix the period at which the interest 
5. 204 Va. 450, 132 S.E.2d 450 (1963). 
6. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 11-12 (1964). 
7. 204 Va. 723, 133 S.E.2d 299 (1963). 
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shall commence." 8 In Beale v. King,9 an action to recover the reasonable 
value of an attorney's services, the Court held this provision to be applicable 
to an unliquidated as well as to a liquidated contract claim and restored the 
jury's verdict allowing interest from the time at which the services had 
been concluded. 
Doctors and lawyers frequently work on a quantum meruit basis, and their 
demands for payment are more conservative in accord with the ethics of 
their professions. They are sometimes regarded as "fair game" by reluctant 
debt payers, and the impetus of this decision allowing interest from the time 
of conclusion of the services may make such game less fair or at least a lot 
less fun. In the Beale case the services had been concluded in 1943; thus 
the interest recovery would exceed the principal sum. 
D. Limitations Period for Open Account 
Section 8-223, discussed in the preceding section, also permits allowance 
of interest in any suit in equity, or in an action or motion founded on con-
tract, when no jury is impanelled. In Columbia .Heights Section 3, Inc. v. 
Griffith-Consumers Co.10 the Supreme Court of Appeals found no abuse of 
the discretion given by the statute to the trial court in allowing interest from 
the date of the last payment made on an open account. 
Perhaps of greater significance was the issue of when the statute of limi-
tations begins to run upon an open account. Is it from the date of the last 
item furnished or service performed, dra\ving \vith it all of the other items, 
or does a separable cause of action arise from the date of each item so that 
each item is barred upon the running of its respective period? The choice 
has usually depended upon whether the account was a mutual one, with 
goods or services fiowing both ways, in which case the last item proved on 
either side commenced the running of the period, or a single account, \vith 
goods or services furnished by only one of the parties and the right to pay-
ment arising upon the billing for each transaction, albeit the unpaid balance 
for prior items is carried forward.11 However, in Columbia Heights, al-
though a single account with bills rendered monthly was involved, it was 
not shown that the parties treated the items charged as severable. Payments 
had been made in round figures which bore no relation to the individual 
items or the existing balance, and the Court found no intention to treat 
the contract as other than entire with final payment due upon its termina-
tion. The furnishing of a thirty-nine dollar item a few days less than three 
years before commencement of the action was held to draw with it, for 
8. VA. ConE ANN. § 8-223 (Supp. 1964). 
9. 204 Va. 443, 132 S.E.2d 476 (1963). 
10. 205 Va. 43, 135 S.E.2d 116 (1964). 
ll. See I AM. juR. 2d Accounts and Accounting § 15 (1962); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 201 
(1928) 0 
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measurement of the period, an unpaid balance of more than $8,400 for prior 
items, the Court stressing the rule that the burden of showing that the 
statutory period had expired was on the defendant. 
E. Covenant Not To Sue Distinguisbed from Release 
The distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue, in composi-
tion and consequences, was e:-.:plored by the Court in Lackey v. Brooks.1~ 
A lease of vehicular equipment provided that the lessee should not be liable 
for any damage to the equipment, whether or not the fault of the lessee or 
its employees. The lessor was to carry insurance to protect itself against 
the risks and name the lessee as coinsured so that no right of subrogation 
might arise in favor of the insurer against the lessee. Damage occurred to a 
leased vehicle as a result of a collision allegedly caused by the negligence 
of the lessee's driver and the lessor sued the driver. 
If the nonliability provision were to be construed as a release of the lessee, 
the Court said that it would operate also to release the lessee's employee 
on the theory that the release of one joint tort-feasor releases the others 
jointly liable, and its corollary that the release of a master for the tortious 
act of the servant also releases the servant. On the other hand, a covenant 
not to sue one joint tort-feasor does not discharge the others; nor does a 
covenant not to sue the master free his servant. The Court construed the 
provision to be a covenant not to sue, as at the time of the lease there was 
no claim in existence to be released, and held that the covenant was no 
defense to the driver-employee. 
The lower court had also construed the provision to be a covenant not 
to sue, but one encompassing the lessee's employees. The Supreme Court 
of Appeals could find no such intent of the parties that the covenant should 
benefit the lessee's employees and accordingly reversed. 
F. Absolute Promisor Not Excused by Tbird Party's Disabling Act 
In Gunnell v. Nello L. Teer Co.,13 defendant had contracted to buy fill 
dirt, known by the plaintiff seller as intended to be used in fulfillment of 
defendant buyer's contract for state highway construction. Subsequently, 
the State Highway Commission had refused to allow the soil on seller's 
land to be used in construction of the highway as it failed to meet certain 
content specifications. Buyer then had refused to take and pay for the fill 
dirt, asserting in defense to seller's subsequent suit impossibility and mutual 
mistake. 
The Court found only a unilateral mistake on defendant's part in supposing 
that the soil would be suitable without subjecting it to comprehensive tests, 
12. 204 Va. 428, 132 S.E.2d 461 (1963). 
13. 205 Va. 28, 135 S.E.2d 104 (1964). 
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and ruled that no impossibility stems from the inability of an absolute 
promisor to control the actions of a third party. A promise may, of course, 
be conditioned upon obtaining the act or consent of a third party, but the 
condition is not implied solely because the promisee knows that such act 
or consent is necessary.14 More concisely, the buyer's promise is absolute. 
A failure of consideration due to frustration of purpose is sometimes 
confused with, or supposedly encompassed within, a defense of impossi-
bility. The latter envisages impossibility of the promisor's performance, 
whereas the former involves the worthlessness of the consideration therefor 
upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a circumstance beyond the control 
of either party. But for either defense to prevail, it must be shown that 
such circumstance formed the basis of the contract between the parties.I5 
In the Gunnell case, the Court appears to have passed only upon the aspect 
of impossibility and not frustration of purpose. The result should be the 
same, however, so long as the Court finds, as it did in effect, that acceptance 
of the dirt by the Highway Commission was not a condition of the contract 
merely because the seller understood that it was buyer's intention to use the 
dirt in construction of the road building project. 
G. Provision Construed in Light of Contract Objectives 
Under section 43-21 of the Virginia Code, deeds of trust given for con-
struction loans prior to commencement of construction are subordinated 
to mechanics' liens to the extent of the value added to the encumbered 
property by the new construction.16 The priorities may, of course, be 
reversed by agreement of the mechanics' lienors, and in Northern Virginia 
Savings & Loan Association v. J. B. Kendall Co.p the lienholders agreed to 
serve as trustees to complete and sell the unfinished houses of the financially 
insecure developer and to apply the proceeds of sales first to the subsequently 
incurred costs of completion and then to the "payment of construction loans 
to the ... [creditors] upon the settlement of the sale of any house." Prior 
to this contract the construction loan creditors had advanced substantial 
sums to the developer for construction of the houses on the security of deeds 
of trust, and unpaid mechanics and materialmen had filed mechanics' liens. 
Induced by the contract, the construction loan creditors advanced additional 
14. See Foreman v. E. Caligari & Co., 204 Va. 284, 130 S.E.2d 447 (1963), discussed 
in Curtis, C01ltracts and Sales, 1962-1963 Annual Survey of Va. Law, 49 VA. L. REv. 
1402, 1405-06 (1963). 
15. 6 CoRBIN, CoNTRACIS §§ 1320-22 (1962). 
16. VA. CoDE ANN; §43-:21 (1953); see W. T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 
206 F. Supp. 878, 881-83 (WD. Va. 1962), aff'd, 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963). This 
section does not give similar priority to liens arising out of the "repair or improvement" 
of existing buildings. VA. Coo& ANN.§ 43-21 (1953). 
17. 205 Va.136, 135 S.E.2d 178 (1964). 
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sums to enable completion and sale of the houses and contended that the 
quoted provision gave them priority over the previously filed mechanics' 
liens for the funds advanced by them prior to, as well as after, the date of 
the contract. Construing the provision in the light of the whole of the 
contract and its objectives, the Court of Appeals, affirming the chancellor's 
decree, found no intention of the mechanics' lienors to subordinate their 
prior liens to the prior deeds of trust, but only to the repayment of subse-
quent advances, and that the subsequent advances were made as a means 
of salvaging a portion of the prior advances. 
H. Creditor's Taking Absolute Title Consumes His Security Interest 
A conditional vendor, or his assignee, has many alternatives for redress 
upon the purchaser's default in payment. He may enforce his lien by peti-
tion to a trial judge or a bill in equity pursuant to section 55-91 of the 
Virginia Code;1S he may institute an action at law for recovery of the pur-
chase price; or he may repossess and sell the property at public auction, and 
not lose his right to a deficiency judgment if he complies with the procedures 
set forth in section 55-93.19 He may also take the absolute title to the prop-
erty with the consent of the purchaser, but if an assignee does so without 
the knowledge of the assignor-endorser of the note, the security interest 
may merge into the legal title so acquired and the liability of the endorser 
discharged for impairment of the security. So held the Court in ] oyner v. 
Gray beal20 on finding that the assignee did not intend to preserve the lien 
upon the purchaser's transfer to him of the certificate of title to an auto-
mobile. 
The liability of the purchaser was not in issue since only the endorser 
took action to set aside a judgment by confession obtained by the assignee 
against the maker and the endorser of the note. Nothing is said in the 
opinion as to transfer of possession of the automobile to the assignee as 
well as the certificate of title. Is there a "repossession" discharging any 
further liability of the purchaser if not followed by public sale where abso-
lute title, but not physical possession of the property, is surrendered by the 
purchaser? Or is the purchaser's voluntary execution of the certificate of 
title in favor of the assignee a "new contract in writing" between them? 
These are interesting questions regarding the applicability of section 55-93 
which were posed by the circumstances in the case but were not in issue 
before the Court. 
18. VA CoDE ANN. § 55-91 (1959). This section was repealed, effective January I, 
1966, by Va. Acts of Assembly 1964, ch. 219, which enacted the Uniform Commercial 
Code. 
19. VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-91 (Supp. 1964). This section was also repealed pursuant to 
the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. See note 18 supra. 
20. 204 Va. 543, 132 S.E.2d 467 (1963). 
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I. Obligations and Not Nmnes Determine Contract Parties 
During the past year construction of section 8-223 of the Virginia Code, 
regarding the allowance of interest on claims, occupied some of the time 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as well as that 
of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The decisions of both courts 
support the view that the section permits great latitude in the allowance or 
disallowance of interest on claims, liquidated or unliquidated, in contract or 
in tort, litigated with or without a jury. A jury's allowance of interest on 
an unliquidated contract claim and a judge's allowance on an open account 
were upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeals.21 In the Fourth Circnit 
case of Newton v. American Surety Co.,22 the district court's disallowance of 
interest was upheld on the ground that, although interest may be allowed 
under the Virginia statute even on an unliquidated claim, the plaintiff failed 
to provide clear proof of some date earlier than judgment from which it 
could be computed. 
The action was one against the surety for a manufacturer to recover for 
the manufacturer's breach of a contract made in name between the plaintiff 
construction contractor and a building supply company. Despite the manu-
facturer's not having been named as a party to the contract, the court found 
that all of the parties understood that the goods were to be manufactured 
by it in accordance with certain plans and specifications, and in fact the 
purchase order was rewritten to show that it was issued to the manufacturer 
when the supply company was unable to obtain bond. Recovery from the 
surety was permitted for the difference between the contract price and 
that paid to a third party for the materials upon the manufacturer's default. 
]. Conflict of Statutes of Frauds 
Under the Virginia statute of frauds, no action may be brought on an 
oral contract which caunot be performed within one year.23 The North 
Carolina statute contains no such provision, and the oral employment con-
tract in Stein v. Pulaski Furniture Corp.24 was made in that state. However, 
suit for its breach was brought in a federal district court in Virginia. The 
court, aclmowledging the conflict of laws rule that the validity of a con-
tract is determined by the law of the state where made, explored the nature 
of the Virginia statute to ascertain whether it was procedural, and thus 
controlling in the forum state, or substantive, and thus subordinate to the 
21. Beale v. King, 204 Va. 443, 132 S.E.2d 476 (1963), discussed in paragraph C; 
Columbia Heights Section 3, Inc. v. Griffith-Consumers Co., 205 Va. 43, 135 S.E.2d 
116 (1964), discussed in paragraph D. 
22. 329 F.2d 299 (4th Cir.1964). 
23. VA. Coo& ANN.§ 11-2(7) (1964). 
24. 217 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Va. 1963). 
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law of North Carolina. Tracing the origin of the Virginia statute, and 
considering the wording of section 11-2, "no action shall be brought," as 
distinguished from the "shall be void" wording of section 11-1,2.5 Judge 
Michie decided that section 11-2 was procedural or remedial and, accord-
ingly, applied it in dismissing the action. 
25. v ..... CoDE ANN.§ 11-1 (1964). 
